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I Introduction 
Objectives and scope of the study 
This study has two main objectives.1 The first is to investigate complementary 
and competitive deposit and credit links between informal and 
formal/semi-formal financial sectors of the economy of Malawi. More 
specifically, the study examines the behaviour of lenders and borrowers under 
different link relationships and the impact of this on the provision of credit 
within the financial system. The second objective is to determine the 
significance of direct links between informal financial institutions (IFIs) and 
formal/semi-formal financial institutions (FFIs) with respect to savings 
mobilization and the process of financial intermediation. Drawing on the 
results, the study then suggests policy measures that may be adopted to further 
integrated development of the financial sector of the economy of Malawi. 
The first objective addresses what are known as indirect deposit and credit 
links. These links are competitive if an increase in deposits at IFIs leads to a 
reduction in deposits at FFIs, and vice versa, or, if an increase in borrowing 
from FFIs is accompanied by a reduction in borrowing from IFIs, and vice 
versa. In each case, changes in the opposite direction would occur irrespective 
of the cause. By contrast, if an increase in deposits in one sector is 
accompanied by an increase in deposits in the other, or if an increase in 
borrowing in one sector is accompanied by an increase in borrowing in the 
other, then, irrespective of the type of cause, the indirect links are 
complementary. 
Direct deposit and credit links are those that exist between informal 
financial sector (IFS) institutions and the formal/semi-formal financial sector 
(FFS) institutions.2 Direct deposit links (e.g., with IFIs depositing funds at 
FFIs) would help reduce the level of idle cash balances at IFIs, while at the 
same time enhancing the capability of commercial banks to create money; 
whereas direct credit links (e.g., with credit flowing from FFFs to IFIs) would 
help to relieve the liquidity problem of IFIs. 
In this study, these link relationships are examined with regard to all the 
IFIs and FFIs. But in order to minimize generality, the study focuses on money 
lenders (katapila) and savings and credit associations (SCAs) in the informal 
financial sector, and on commercial banks in the formal financial sector. 
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After a review of relevant literature, and a discussion of the database, the 
rest of the report is presented in three sections. Section II examines linkages 
in the credit market based on three link relationships: (i) a competitive scenario 
between the two sectors; (ii) a complementary scenario between them; and (iii) 
the formal sector channelling its resources through the informal sector 
(directly, or via the semi-formal financial sub-sector) to ultimate borrowers. 
Section III examines the linkage in savings mobilization, with emphasis on the 
potential use of deposit facilities of banks by informal savings and credit 
associations (SCAs). Lastly, Section IV presents a summary and explains the 
policy implications of the study. 
Review of relevant literature 
Being primarily concerned with explaining baseline information and data, the 
first phase of our study (Chipeta and Mkandawire, 1990) did not fully address 
the question of links. Beyond suggesting that credit extended by estate owners 
to their tenants and credit extended by employers to their employees might 
compete with similar credit extended by FFIs, that mobilization of financial 
savings by SCAs might compete with savings mobilization by formal financial 
institutions, and that, otherwise, credit extended by the rest of the IFIs seemed 
to complement credit from the FFIs, the study did not analyze these links in 
any detail. Furthermore, it did not consider the extent to which these links 
promote or limit savings mobilization and financial intermediation. 
A number of recent empirical studies have either assumed or confirmed the 
existence of links between the IFS and the FFS. Money lenders, indigenous 
bankers and co-operative savings associations (CSAs), for example, are known 
to be depositing surplus funds with FFIs. Similarly, customers of FFIs have 
lines of credit with IFIs (Chandavarkar, 1990). Among other things, these links 
establish the channel through which credit control and monetary policies 
targeted at the FFS affect the volume of resources and credit in the IFS and 
hence the overall effectiveness of financial policies. 
In pioneering econometric studies, Acharya and Madhur (1983; 1984) have 
demonstrated that, because of the existence of these links, changes in monetary 
policy produce a significant effect in the desired direction on the availability 
and cost of funds in India at the aggregate level. In their 1983 study, Acharya 
and Madhur formulated a simple model that characterized demand and supply 
in the IFS and FFS as well as the links between them. The model was cast in 
terms of a "fixed-price", "credit rationed", commercial bank credit market, and 
a "flexible price" informal credit market. The links between the two were 
established by the spill-over of excess demand from the former to the latter. 
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They then identified those parameters the empirical magnitudes of which are 
necessary for assessing the efficacy of monetary-credit policy in altering the 
cost of funds in the informal credit market. These parameters were estimated 
using annual time-series data from the Indian economy for the period 1951-52 
to 1976-77. It is worth noting that the results of the model, as explained above, 
are crucially dependent on the existence of clients who borrow from both the 
IFS and the FFS. 
In a different study, informal credit markets in the Republic of Korea are 
also said to have facilitated the working of monetary policy by transmitting 
signals and funds promptly. But, at the same time, they are said to have 
mitigated the more arbitrary and disruptive consequences of credit controls in 
the formal sector and thus to have contributed to the maintenance of high rates 
of economic growth (Cole and Park, 1983). 
On the savings side, an increase in interest rates in Taiwan and the Republic 
of Korea that accompanied the financial reforms of the 1950s and 1960s 
induced an inflow of savings from the informal to the formal financial sector. 
In Thailand, by contrast, significant flows of savings into the informal sector 
occurred from time to time because of higher rates of interest on chit funds, 
pyramid schemes, etc. (Chandavarkar, 1990). There, the informal financial 
sector is accordingly seen as a vehicle for financial dis-intermediation by 
stimulating borrowing and lending outside the formal financial sector. Again, 
what may be worth noting is that shifts in funds between the two sectors must 
depend on the existence of clients who deposit funds in both the IFS and the 
FFS. 
Other studies have emphasized the need to establish or strengthen existing 
links between the IFS and the FFS.3 According to one authority, informal 
financial markets must be developed and integrated with formal financial 
markets so that: (i) savings in the other sectors can be lent in the more 
productive agricultural sector, (ii) the informal financial markets can share in 
the available amount of safe deficit financing through the development by the 
central bank of appropriate commercial and financial instruments, (iii) there 
can be a better allocation of financial resources between export and domestic 
crops and between commodities in strong demand and those in weak demand, 
and (iv) lenders in informal financial markets can begin to adopt some of the 
practices of formal financial markets, such as accepting deposits and raising 
additional capital outside the family enterprise (U Tun Wai, 1981). How the 
IFS and the FFS were to be integrated was not spelt out in this study. 
Another argument for advocating integration of the IFS and the FFS is that 
a segmented financial market induces a loss in welfare (Quarcoo, 1979). Two 
different sources of welfare loss have been identified. The first arises from 
misallocation of credit between the FFS and the IFS. Borrowers in the two 
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sectors obtain credit at two different rates of interest. It is assumed that the 
interest rate in the IFS is higher than that in the FFS and so it constrains 
demand for credit compared to the FFS. If the two sectors were unified with 
a single rate of interest, the interest rate would rise in the FFS and fall in the 
IFS, reducing demand in the FFS and increasing it in the IFS. The reduction 
in the volume of credit in the FFS would represent a loss in welfare and the 
increase in the IFS would represent a gain in welfare. If the gain exceeded the 
loss, the difference would represent the net welfare loss before unification of 
the financial sector. The second source of welfare loss arises from the 
differential rates of return on savings between the two sectors, as a result of 
which there is under-consumption of financial services. According to the model 
developed by Quarcoo, the demand for financial services (bank deposits) is a 
negative function of the spread between the rate of return on informal sector 
loans (r) and the bank deposit rate of interest (/'). The spread, r-i, represents the 
opportunity cost of holding financial assets. Under financial market 
segmentation, r-i is likely to be large, hence the demand for bank deposits will 
be relatively low. Integration of the two sectors is assumed to bring about a 
reduction in the r-i gap, making bank deposits relatively more attractive. Bank 
deposits, or the demand for financial services, are therefore expected to 
increase. The increase in the consumption of financial services, which is 
repressed under segmentation, is a measure of the welfare loss that results from 
financial sector segmentation. 
Furthermore, the segmentation of the capital market, as manifested by the 
non-price credit rationing of the small indigenous entrepreneurs by the formal 
financial system, is socially non-optimal. This arises primarily from the failure 
by private formal financial institutions to estimate accurately the social costs 
and benefits of financing the small entrepreneurs' projects. It has been argued 
that formal financial institutions discriminate against small indigenous 
borrowers because they either underestimate borrower credit-worthiness or 
overestimate the administration, collection and risk costs of extending credit 
to them. In addition, private formal financial institutions do not take into 
account in their cost-benefit calculation the external economies that extension 
of credit to these borrowers would yield to the rest of the economy. Among 
such external economies are the potential emergence of an indigenous 
entrepreneurial class and the creation of opportunities for higher employment 
and rising standards of living of rural communities (Quarcoo, 1980). 
Apart from failure to estimate accurately social costs and benefits, non-price 
credit rationing seems to generate other distortions in the capital market. First, 
the suppressed loan interest rates in the formal financial sector do not reflect 
the opportunity cost of capital. Instead, market forces are prevented from 
determining, for both formal and informal sectors, a uniform cost of capital 
LINKS BETWEEN FINANCIAL SECTORS IN MALAWI 5 
(with an appropriate risk premium adjustment) that would facilitate optimal 
allocation of society's scarce capital resources. Furthermore, the failure of the 
formal financial sector to earn high equilibrium rates of interest is reflected in 
unduly low returns to depositors. This discourages savings mobilization and 
limits the development of financial intermediaries (Quarcoo, 1980). 
According to another contributor, reform of the whole financial system is 
required to reduce market dualism and achieve a uniform and integrated 
financial market. Such a unified financial market would be structurally 
efficient, implying that efficiency of the payments system and efficiency of 
credit allocation would be achieved (Johnston, 1968). 
Financial dualism also undermines efforts by monetary authorities to design 
a consistent financial policy. Objectives may be difficult to define in the 
absence of reliable aggregate economic indicators since informal sector 
activities do not appear in national accounts. Tax records would provide 
reliable data, but the informal financial sector escapes direct taxation and so 
such data are not available. Moreover, regulation through credit volumes and 
interest rates is not efficacious when there is a considerable amount of liquidity 
outside the formal banking sector. The ability of borrowers to switch from the 
controlled formal/semi-formal to the uncontrolled informal financial markets 
may also impair the effectiveness of monetary policy (Germidis, 1990). 
Another consequence of financial dualism is that it may adversely affect 
development through its effect on capital accumulation and its distribution in 
a developing country, and, hence, its rate of economic growth. Financial 
dualism creates sectoral and regional disparities as regards the mobilization and 
allocation of funds, e.g., rural savings are transferred to urban centres. This 
leads to a differential in the growth rate between sectors as their development 
becomes dependent on their access to different sources of credit (Germidis, 
1990). Negative effects on equity result from the fact that the informal sector's 
clients are usually the small poorer borrowers whose sources of credit may 
have inadequate but high-priced resources. 
In a study that suggests specific strategies for integrating domestic financial 
markets in LDCs (Quarcoo, 1980), the author explains that segmentation of 
these markets is reflected in unequal costs of capital in the IFS and the FFS. 
Integration of the two sectors would need unification of the cost of capital 
through two reform measures. One would involve the maintenance of high 
positive real interest rate charges on loans to small entrepreneurs and positive 
real interest payments on deposits and other financial assets. The other would 
involve decentralization of decision-making and increasing accessibility of 
small entrepreneurs to financial markets. 
With respect to Malawi, it was suggested in the first phase of our study that 
one means of integrating the IFS and the FFS is to get each sector associated 
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with the activities of the other and to adopt appropriate techniques from the 
other. It was also suggested that IFIs should deposit surplus funds with FFIs 
and meet their requirement of extra resources if in deficit through borrowing 
from the FFS; and that IFIs should serve as agents of FFIs (Chipeta and 
Mkandawire, 1990). 
While not putting forward specific strategies for integrating financial 
markets, it has been suggested that the means for achieving this should be 
consistent with the causes of financial dualism (Germidis, 1990). In so far as 
the IFS is a response to the deficiencies and inefficiencies of the FFS, some 
of the things that are required are institutional and operational reforms of the 
FFS. These reforms should include "informalizing" the FFS by adopting the 
features of the IFS to make it accessible and attractive to small-scale and 
medium-scale business enterprises (SMEs). But, to the extent that financial 
dualism is an aspect of structural dualism of the economy itself, the strategy 
for integrating financial markets should include measures for transforming and 
institutionalizing the IFS itself. 
More recently, an attempt has been made to analyze the effect on the terms 
and conditions of loans of linkages between formal and informal lenders (Bell, 
1990). Drawing on the experience of rural India, where state agencies, 
co-operatives and banks were established to reduce the influence of money 
lenders by competing with them, Bell analyzes how the welfare of the 
borrower is affected under four different scenarios (part of his framework is 
used in Section II of this study). The first scenario consists of money lenders 
operating in the absence of state agencies; the second involves exclusive 
institutional loans or institutional lenders operating in the absence of money 
lenders. Given these two scenarios, he attempts to establish equilibrium in the 
credit market with exclusive contracts using such novel concepts as the 
iso-expected profit curve of the money lender, the iso-expected net-income 
curve of the borrower, notional individual credit demand, notional supply of 
loans and borrower's opportunity set when dealing with banks. He considers 
money lenders both under conditions of monopoly and perfect competition. 
The result of these scenarios depends on whether institutional credit is rationed 
at the regulated rate of interest. 
The third scenario is one of non-exclusive institutional contracts. Here, 
borrowing from the informal sector is considered to take place after the 
borrower has failed to obtain formal credit. Under this scenario, a spill-over 
of demand from the formal to the informal sector of the credit market will take 
place as long as there is rationing in the formal sector at a fixed rate of interest 
and lenders find it profitable to grant credit in the informal sector after 
screening the borrower. 
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In the fourth scenario, it is assumed that money lenders act as 
intermediaries of formal lenders. Bell explains how, in this situation, the cost 
of funds to the money lender will decline. The impact of this on the money 
lender's clients will depend on whether he is a monopolist or a perfect 
competitor. If he is a perfect competitor, the entire gain from the decline in the 
rate of interest accrues to borrowers, whereas if he is a monopolist the gain is 
shared between lender and borrowers. This suggests that the presence of the 
money lender in the credit market does not necessarily have a negative impact 
on the borrower. On the basis of this analysis and conclusion, Bell then 
stresses: (i) the need to use the knowledge of informal lenders in the FFS, (ii) 
the need to interlink institutional credit with the marketing of goods and supply 
of inputs, (iii) the need to remove restrictions on the trader-money lender, and 
(iv) the need to use direct measures to increase incomes in underdeveloped 
areas. 
The database 
To address the issues which are the concern of this study, we use both 
descriptive and analytical methods. These methods are used in explaining the 
direct and indirect link relationships on the savings side, as well as on the 
credit side. They are also used in conceptualizing observed linkages. 
Primary data generated in a random sample survey of households carried 
out in 1989 provided the basis for assessing responses and attitudes of savers, 
borrowers and lenders. Most of the data presented describe the experiences of 
sample survey households that were interviewed in rural areas of Dowa, 
Lilongwe, Mangochi, Mzimba, Nkhata Bay, Rumphi and Zomba Districts and 
in the urban areas of Blantyre City, Mangochi Township, Mponela Township, 
Mzimba Boma, Mzuzu City, Nkhata Bay Boma and Rumphi Boma. In a few 
cases, however, data had to be estimated for the country as a whole. In this 
regard, estimates of the number of borrowers, lenders and savers have had to 
be weighted. How the weights and estimates were arrived at is explained in 
Annex 1. The rest of the data are presented in the text and tables. 
Out of the 1,611 respondents interviewed in 1989, 1,088 stated that they 
were engaged in farming and/or in non-agricultural activities, while 523 stated 
that they were not engaged in any of these activities. For the purpose of this 
study, these 1,088 will be referred to as SMEs (small- and medium-scale 
business enterprises), and the 523 will be regarded as households. Three 
hundred and sixty-three SMEs (33.4 per cent of the total) saved from some of 
their income prior to the interview, as did 352 households (67.3 per cent) 
(Tables 1 and 2). 
Table 1 Sums of money saved by SMEs by mode in Kwacha* 
SMEs 
With formal 
financial sector 
With semi-formal 
financial sector 
With informal 
financial sector Total 
Total Av, 
Number amount amount 
Total Av. 
Number amount amount 
Total Av. 
Number amount amount 
Total Av. 
Number amount amount 
Those combining 
FFS and IFS 
65 52,033 800 
Those using FFS only 129 173,785 1,460 
Those using IFS only 
Total 194 225,808 1,164 
4 1,183 296 
3 2,664 888 
7 3,847 549 
69 16,905 245 
162 8,081 50 
231 24,986 108 
69 70,111 1,016 
132 176,449 1,446 
162 8,081 
363 254,641 
50 
701 
* Based on the 1989 survey 
Table 2 Sums of money saved by households by mode in Kwacha 
Households 
With formal 
financial sector 
With semi-formal 
financial sector 
With informal 
financial sector Total 
Total Av. 
Number amount amount 
Total Av. 
Number amount amount 
Total Av. 
Number amount amount 
Total Av. 
Number amount amount 
Those combining 
FFF and IFS 
47 39,083 
Those using FFS only 154 74,441 
Those using IFS only 
Total 201 113,524 
831 
483 
565 
4 210 53 
6 233 39 
10 443 44 
51 1,258 25 
141 3,802 27 
192 5,060 26 
51 40,551 
160 74,674 
141 3,802 
352 119,027 
795 
467 
27 
338 
Based on the 1989 survey 
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In terms of numbers of savers, the single largest number of SMEs (162, or 
44.6 per cent) saved with the IFS only. Those that used the formal sector in 
combination with the semi-formal sector (132) are the second largest category. 
Last is the number that combined the FFS and the IFS (69) (Table 1). 
However, the data entered in the last row of Table 1 indicate that the formal 
sector is the largest depository of financial savings. 
The above pattern more or less repeats itself with respect to households. As 
the data in Table 2 show, the formal sector is again the largest depository of 
savings and the informal sector is the second largest. The only difference is 
that here the number using the IFS only (141) is not the single largest. 
Five hundred and eighty-five SMEs (53.8 per cent of the total) obtained 
credit from various sources prior to the survey, while out of the 523, 313 (59.8 
per cent) obtained credit (Tables 3 and 4). In terms of numbers of SMEs and 
sums borrowed, the informal sector was the single largest source of credit. It 
was followed by the semi-formal sector in terms of numbers and in terms of 
the amount borrowed by the formal sector. For households, the informal sector 
as a source of credit exceeded the other sectors by large factors (Table 4). In 
the case of SMEs and households, the number that used both the FFS and the 
IFS (i.e., formal, semi-formal and informal) are the smallest. The sums of 
money borrowed are also the smallest (Tables 3 and 4). 
Table 3 Sums of money borrowed by SMEs by source in Kwacha * 
SMEs 
From formal 
financial sector 
From semi-formal 
financial sector 
From informal 
financial sector Total 
Total Av. 
Number amount amount 
Total Av. 
Number amount amount 
Total Av. 
Number amount amount 
Total Av. 
Number amount amount 
Those combining 
FFS and IFS 
Those using FFS only 
Those using IFS only 
Total 
16 76,190 4,762 
19 128,508 6,764 
35 204,698 5,848 
24 11,800 492 
31 20,232 653 
55 32,032 582 
39 4,006 102 
495 207,355 419 
534 211,361 396 
40 91,996 2,300 
50 148,740 2,975 
495 207,355 419 
585 448,091 766 
* Based on the 1989 survey 
Table 4 Sums of money borrowed by households by source in Kwacha* 
Households 
From formal 
financial sector 
From semi-formal 
financial sector 
From informal 
financial sector 
Total Av. 
Number amount amount 
Total Av. 
Number amount amount 
Total Av. 
Number amount amount 
Those combining 
FFS and IFS 
Those using FFS only 
Those using IFS only 
Total 
8 20,758 2595 
9 33,880 3764 
17 54,638 3214 
5 8,048 1,610 
2,115 264 
13 10,163 782 
12 221 18 
284 504,431 1,776 
296 504,652 1,705 
* Based on the 1989 survey 
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Spill-over into the IFS, especially into the money lenders' segment, is not 
a popular way of financing SMEs. In the survey of 1986, out of 1,005 
entrepreneurs who had sought credit for the start-up of their businesses, only 
149 obtained credit from the IFS as against 844 who used their own resources. 
Only three obtained credit from money lenders. For the expansion of their 
businesses, 726 had approached creditors. Of these, only 24 had obtained credit 
from the IFS as against 696 who relied on their own resources. SMEs that are 
likely to borrow from money lenders are those engaged in trading with a high 
rate of turnover or in farming where small seasonal loans are required. Such 
credit is resorted to when no other options are available to the borrower. 
Turning to the issue of complementary links, as stated above, a 
complementary credit link between the IFS and the FFS exists when growth 
in demand for credit from one sector is accompanied by an increase in demand 
for credit from the other sector. In essence, this means that, as an example, an 
increase in capital formation that is financed by FFS credit creates additional 
productive capacity that can be utilized only with IFS credit in order to 
maintain the economy at an equilibrium level (Aryeetey, 1991). Assuming, as 
new structuralists do, that the IFS is the provider of residual financing, it is 
asserted that the joint impact on the economy of credit from the two sectors 
will depend on the relative amount of credit from the IFS. Considered to be 
additional finance in excess of what comes from the FFS, an increase in 
demand for credit from the IFS is thus seen to be created by increasing use of 
FFS credit. 
The data presented in Table 5 do not provide much evidence of the 
existence of complementarity between FFS credit and IFS credit. For SMEs 
using both the FFS and the IFS, the average sum borrowed from the latter does 
not seem to rise or fall in relation to the average sum borrowed from the 
former, except when we look at credit obtained by vendors, using the averages 
in the first row as the base. We arrive at the same result whether we compare 
informal with formal credit, or informal with semi-formal credit. We also 
arrive at the same result if we compare the total average sums in the last 
column of Table 5 with the average sums received in credit from the informal 
sector. It is worth noting that, taking into consideration credit extended to 
households, using both sectors does not make any difference. If anything, the 
average sums obtained from one sector are inversely related to average sums 
from the other. 
For SMEs combining the FFS and the IFS, again using the average figures 
in the first row as the base, average semi-formal credit does not generally seem 
to rise or fall across sectors along with formal credit, with the exception of the 
smallholder farm sector. And for SMEs that obtained credit only from the FFS, 
using the average sums in the first row as the numeraire reveals that the 
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average sums borrowed from the formal sector do not generally rise or fall 
with average sums borrowed from the semi-formal sector. Comparing average 
sums borrowed by the household sector from the formal and the semi-formal 
sector also reveals the existence of competitiveness rather than 
complementarity. 
This lack of complementarity in credit implies that SMEs do not obtain 
sufficient credit from the IFS to supplement credit from the FFS credit. It also 
explains why the majority of SMEs finance the expansion of their businesses 
out of their own resources generated from employment, in farming and in 
business (Malawi/USAID, 1987). In the 1991 survey of a sub-sample of SMEs, 
29 per cent used their own resources if they did not obtain sufficient credit. 
Selling cattle and motor vehicles to raise finance was resorted to by 15 per 
cent. Another 15 per cent continued to pursue creditors, and only 7.6 per cent 
reported scaling down their business operations. 
Whether using income from one source to finance operations in another 
activity will bring about a net increase in the income of the entrepreneur will 
depend on the relative productivity of the subsidized activity. Not much can 
be said about the experience of our sample SMEs since the data on which an 
assessment could be made were not gathered. 
The procedure which we applied to data in Table 5 to assess whether there 
is complementarity in credit has also been applied to data in Table 6 to 
determine if there is complementarity in deposits. For SMEs combining the 
FFS and the IFS, there is little evidence of complementarity in savings 
between the formal and informal sectors or between the formal and the 
semi-formal sectors. For SMEs and households that used only the FFS, there 
is evidence of complementarity between the formal and semi-formal sector. 
An intermediary role for money lenders 
As stated above, Bell asserts that if a money lender is granted access to 
low-cost FFS credit, this should lower the cost of funds to him regardless of 
the market structure under which he operates. This benefit will then be passed 
on to his borrowers in the form of lower interest charges on loans. If the 
money lender is a perfect competitor and the marginal cost is constant, 
borrowers reap the whole gain from a lower interest rate. If the money lender 
is a monopolist and borrowers can exercise an active threat of strategic default, 
the gain will be shared between the money lender and borrowers. On the basis 
of this analysis, it is concluded that if many money lenders had access to FFS 
credit, the gain to the economy as a whole would be large. 
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But, unfortunately, in Malawi, as in India (Bell, 1990), Ghana (Aryeetey, 
1991), and possibly other less developed countries, the access of money 
lenders to FFS credit is limited. Out of 64 money lenders who were 
interviewed in the 1989 country-wide survey, only 10, or 15.6 per cent, 
reported that they had recently obtained loans from the FFS that totalled Kl . l 
million. Six of them had obtained credit from the smallholder agricultural 
credit scheme amounting to K0.6 million. This credit is granted in the form of 
farm inputs and is, therefore, not available for on-lending to borrowers. The 
remainder, K0.5 million, was borrowed from commercial banks, the Mercantile 
Credit Limited and other formal sources. Since money lenders are involved in 
other types of business and have families to take care of, part of this credit 
could have been used for activities other than money lending. Two of the 
money lenders who borrowed from the FFS also borrowed from the IFS. Then 
there were 20 (31.2 per cent) of the money lenders who borrowed a larger sum 
of K1.2 million, all from the IFS. However, the fact that during the same 
period money lenders failed to meet a credit demand of Kl . l million is an 
indication that the credit that they received from either sector was not enough.5 
Just as it is difficult to ascertain from the survey data whether part of the 
credit received by money lenders was on-lent to borrowers, so it is difficult to 
ascertain whether the on-lending of funds, if any took place, led to a reduction 
in the rate of interest charged to borrowers. Equally difficult to determine is 
whether the gain accrued to borrowers only, or was shared between money 
lenders and borrowers. 
The access of money lenders to commercial banks as sources of credit may 
have been facilitated by their savings link with these FFIs. The number of 
money lenders operating in 1989 has been estimated at 36,380 from the main 
survey data. Out of these 11,400 (31.5 per cent) deposited money at FFIs and 
6,821 (18.75 per cent) deposited money at commercial banks in the month 
prior to the survey. With average deposits of K382.95 and K556.08, the total 
sums deposited amounted to K4.4 million and K3.1 million, respectively. The 
bulk of the estimated remainder of K0.6 million was deposited at the Post 
Office Savings Bank. On balance, therefore, money lenders are net creditors 
of the FFS. 
Ill Links through savings mobilization 
Savings patterns of SCAs 
Each member of the SCA contributes a fixed amount of money at the 
beginning of the school year, the amount varying from SCA to SCA. The 
amount is payable in a specified maximum number of months. If a member 
fails to contribute the full amount, the shortfall is subtracted from the portion 
he is supposed to receive when the fund is distributed to the members when 
it is temporarily wound up. 
A major aim is to build up as much money as possible, through interest 
paid on borrowings, for distribution to members when the fund is wound up. 
Therefore, money in the fund is always lent out to members and little or 
nothing is kept by the treasurer. Consequently, there are occasions when 
members who do not really need loans are required to borrow the balance left 
after other members have received their allocations. In some cases such 
involuntary borrowings have been used by members to on-lend to outsiders, 
especially those who may have found other sources of credit more expensive 
or have no access to any other source of credit. Generally, such borrowing by 
a member to assist an outsider is allowed as long as the credit requirements of 
members have been satisfied. 
The amount a member is allowed to borrow per month is expected not to 
be in excess of his monthly salary, which sets an upper limit on his known 
debt-servicing capacity since the standard credit period is one month. Loans 
are supposed to be repaid together with interest immediately after borrowers 
have received their monthly salaries, but the treasurer disburses new loans a 
day or more after pay day in order to give himself time to receive payments 
of maturing loans and interest charges on them, out of which new loans are 
made. If a borrower fails to extinguish his debt voluntarily over a reasonable 
number of months, the extinction is involuntarily effected by deduction from 
his salary: 
The number of respondents who reported taking part in SCAs was 142, or 
8.8 per cent of the total. The size of the SCAs ranged from two to 250 people, 
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with a mean for the whole sample of 38.5 (urban mean 34.8 and rural mean 
40.7). The oldest SCA was formed in 1964. Fifty per cent of the respondents 
stated that their SCAs were formed so that they could have a source of loans; 
30 per cent said that they were formed to earn money for members; while 13 
per cent cited saving as the motive for establishing SCAs. 
Most of the SCAs are formed by workmates (48 per cent) and neighbours 
(35 per cent). This makes it easy to establish and maintain contact. There are 
only a few between friends (3 per cent), relatives (5 per cent), and business 
colleagues (6 per cent). 
Eighty per cent of the respondents stated that their SCAs were run by a 
committee, 13 per cent by a leader, and 5 per cent by all members. 
Employment earnings (51 per cent of the cases) and farming (35 per cent of 
the cases) were the most popular sources of money contributed to the SCAs. 
SCAs have few options with regard to what they can do with deposits 
mobilized from their members, who totalled 72,905 in 1988/89. Most of the 
funds are lent out to members (credit to members in 1988/89 amounted to 
K16.4 million). If resources permit, part of the balance may be loaned to 
non-members (loans to non-members in 1988/89 amounted to K1.4 million). 
The unutilized balances are relatively small during the early part of the life of 
each fund (Tables 7 and 8). During this period, the demand for credit is large 
relative to supply of loanable funds. Among teachers' SCAs, where the life 
cycle of each fund runs from October (when schools open) to July (when 
schools close), for example, the early phase of each fund coincides with heavy 
demand for credit to finance school fees, the purchase of farm inputs and the 
purchase of other items that members could not afford during the school 
holidays. In fact, some SCA members even withhold their own contributions 
to prevent them from passing into the hands of other borrowers. Towards the 
end of the fund's life cycle, most of these needs have been met. As a result, 
demand for credit experiences a relative decline, and idle cash balances rise, 
reaching a peak during the final month (Tables 7 and 8) when the emphasis 
is on receiving repayments pending the distribution of the accumulated fund 
to members. 
The data in Table 7 have been put together after a thorough examination of 
the records of a number of teachers' SCAs in Blantyre and Zomba. The unused 
balances for each selected SCA have been entered in a separate column. In all 
cases, the unused balance is zero during the first few months of the fund. In 
most of the cases, positive balances do not start appearing until February to 
March, after which they rise gradually. The size of the final floating balance, 
which varies directly with the number of members and the volume of 
transactions, can be particularly large. 
1989 Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
Apr 
May 
Jun 
Jul 
15.00 
27.00 
11.80 
1.66 
36.40 
20.20 
1,074.408 
1991 Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
Apr 
May 
Jun 
Jul 
0.00 
5.20 
32.00 
0.00 
55.00 
900.00 
3.824.007 
1988 Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
Apr 
May 
Jun 
Jul 
0.83 
0.00 
0.00 
10.57 
1,888.60 
2,850.63 
5,665.98s 
1 Membership 8 ladies; contribution K40.00 per member at the beginning; interest charge on loans 30% per month. 
2 Membership 9 ladies; contribution K50.00 per month; interest charge on loans 25% per month. 
3 Membership 5 reduced to 3 ladies; contribution K50.00 as above in 1; interest charge 25% per month. 
4 Membership 10; contribution K5.00 per member per month; interest charge 20% per month. 
5 Membership 16 ladies; contribution K50.00 as above in 1; interest rate 20% per month. 
6 Membership 38; contribution K37.24 as above in 1; interest rate 20% per month. 
7 Forecast balance. 
8 Actual balance. 
Table 8 Unlent balances of an' SCA operating on a two-year cycle basis in Kwacha 
May 1985 to May 1987 June 1987 to May 1989 June 1989 to April 1991 
1985 May 10.00 
Jun 11.00 1987 Jun 0.00 1989 Jun 24.48 
Jul 20.00 Jul 21.80 Jul 1.35 
Aug 20.30 Aug 15.70 Aug 38.35 
Sep 18.80 Sep 34.40 Sep 21.35 
Oct 40.80 Oct 10.60 Oct 36.55 
Nov 27.10 Nov 19.50 Nov 30.05 
Dec 13.20 Dec 3.70 Dec 35.05 
Jan 25.40 1988 Jan 3.25 1990 Jan 9.65 
Feb 12.40 Feb 12.45 Feb 13.95 
Mar 8.80 Mar 60.06 Mar 52.45 
Apr 22.50 Apr 19.75 Apr 42.95 
May 7.55 May 25.55 May 45.39 
Jun 50.45 Jun 30.90 Jun 21.26 
Jul 66.35 Jul 54.00 Jul 23.28 
Aug 64.85 Aug 261.56 Aug 16.88 
Sep 216.85 Sep 226.46 Sep 32.48 
Oct 154.35 Oct 119.86 Oct 35.88 
Nov 41.65 Nov 77.46 Nov 29.13 
Dec 110.65 Dec 74.36 Dec 142.23 
Table 8 cont ... 
1987 Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
Apr 
May 
Jun 
90.65 
168.35 
133.65 
143.65 
200.45 
835.152 
1989 Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
Apr 
May 
Jun 
32.26 
52.36 
58.96 
67.76 
221.06 
802.962 
1991 Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
Apr 
May 
29.42 
23.82 
256.48 
10.68 
1,003.762 
1 Membership varied between 7 and 10; contribution K5 at the beginning and K1 per month per member thereafter; interest charge 10 % 
per month. 
End of cycle balance pending distribution of principal and interest among members. 
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Table 8 has data on idle balances that have been extracted from the records 
of an SCA whose members belong to a different profession. All these members 
work for the same establishment in Zomba. Their number has varied between 
seven and ten since the SCA was formed in 1985. As this SCA operates on the 
basis of a two-year cycle, the data in the table cover a much longer period than 
those in Table 7. The pattern here is different in that balances can occur from 
the very beginning of the fund's cycle, but they too seem to rise as the fund 
nears the end of its life, for the reasons given above. And again, the floating 
balance, whose lifetime is now much shorter, tends to be relatively large 
compared to other idle balances. 
It is out of these idle cash balances that SCAs may make deposits at 
commercial banks. In the main survey, details of how SCAs banked their 
resources were not solicited. According to a 1990 survey of a sub-sample of 
30 SCAs, only seven (or 23 per cent) deposited money at FFIs. Of these, 57 
per cent made use of commercial banks and 43 per cent made use of the Post 
Office Savings Bank. The main motive for depositing resources at these 
institutions was safety or security rather than interest income, since interest 
rates there are much lower than those that SCAs earn from the credit that they 
extend. The few SCAs that deposited their funds at banks did so for a short 
period, usually a month or two when lending to members stopped or was 
curtailed pending the distribution of the principal and interest among members. 
Otherwise SCAs rarely deposited balances. The usual practice was for the 
treasurer or some other SCA official to hold on to unlent balances in case 
there was an unanticipated demand for credit from members. The problem was 
how to estimate the likely extent of such unanticipated demand so that SCAs 
did not have to carry large idle cash balances. 
Although the deposit of surplus funds by SCAs is by a small number of 
those IFIs, it does serve a number of useful purposes. First, it enhances 
opportunities for financial intermediation by FFIs during the March to 
September season when their own liquidity comes under strain. Second, it 
offers a safe haven for SCA funds. Third, it enables SCAs to earn extra 
interest income for their members. Fourth, by reducing the number of people 
who queue up at banks to make deposits and withdrawals, the practice helps 
to cut down the cost to banks of mobilizing savings. The potential for 
increasing these gains to the economy is large considering that there are about 
2,000 SCAs in Malawi. 
IV Summary and 
policy implications of the study 
Using both descriptive and analytical techniques, this study has attempted to 
investigate direct and indirect linkages between the informal and 
formal/semi-formal financial sectors in the economy of Malawi. The study has 
covered both credit allocation and savings mobilization. From the investigation, 
the following observations and conclusions have been drawn: 
1. The segmentation of the IFS and the FFS in the economy of Malawi is 
large, but it is not complete, either in credit allocation or in savings 
mobilization. Both indirect and direct credit and deposit links exist. The 
indirect credit and deposit linkages are significant. The direct credit links 
are insignificant, but the direct deposit links with money lenders are 
significant. 
2. Indirect credit linkages are largely competitive as regards SMEs. With 
respcct to households, they are also competitive. In both respects, the lack 
of complementarity in credit implies that insufficient credit is obtained from 
the IFS to supplement FFS credit. Concerning deposit links, those relating 
to SMEs that deal with both the IFS and the FFS are competitive, while 
those relating to SMEs that use only the FFS, and to households, are 
complementary as between formal and semi-formal sectors. In the former 
case, those that choose to save with the IFS because of high interest rates 
do not save much with the FFS. In the latter case, there is no interest 
differential between the formal and the semi-formal sub-sectors. Those who 
save with the formal sub-sector also save with the semi-formal sub-sector 
to benefit from the non-interest advantage of this sub-sector. 
The intermediary credit role of the IFS between borrowers and the FFS is 
•not significant. As a result, there is little competition between IFIs and FFIs 
in the delivery of credit. Furthermore, credit from both the IFS and the FFS 
to SMEs is insufficient. Making more credit available to these enterprises 
by both the IFS and the FFS must remain a matter of priority in 
policy-making. For the IFS, an improved ability to lend should come from 
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increases in wage, farm and business incomes, as these are the main sources 
of funds for lending. Funds can also come from FFIs for on-lending to 
ultimate SME borrowers. One commercial bank has recently made a grant 
of K0.25 million to SEDOM for on-lending to such borrowers. If SEDOM 
can stop restricting lending to manufacturing SMEs and begin lending to 
IFIs, an important channel would be opened for transmitting FFS funds 
through the IFS. For the FFS, an improved ability to lend should come from 
greater preparedness to assume credit risks and from adoption of appropriate 
methods of SME risk assessment and management. 
4. The limited amount of competition between the IFS and the FFS has 
another unfavourable implication. It is that the opportunities open to 
borrowers are themselves limited, and, hence, they are not able to improve 
their welfare by freely negotiating on the two credit markets for the best 
terms and conditions. 
5. Concerning resource mobilization, few of the savings handled by 
commercial banks and other FFIs are initially mobilized by SCAs as the 
links between them are weak. 
6. The virtual absence of deposit links between SCAs and the FFS implies that 
the former carry large seasonal idle cash balances on which no interest is 
earned, while FFIs are denied extra resources for lending during the very 
period when the liquidity of commercial banks comes under strain. 
7. Because increased lending by the FFS will require more resources, savings 
mobilization must be improved. Among other things, tapping the ideal 
resources of SCAs might be one way of augmenting the lendable resources 
of the FFS. As the idle cash balances of SCAs are available for short 
periods of time, the seven and 30-day call deposit accounts would suit them 
best, provided the committees that manage SCAs can be persuaded to 
deposit surplus funds with commercial banks, and provided commercial 
banks can lower the minimum deposit requirement, currently K1,000. For 
SCAs that are far away from branches of commercial banks, the 
development of similar instruments by other FFIs would serve their 
interests. 
Annex 
Analysis of main survey data 
Excluding refugees, the estimated population of Malawi at the middle of 1989 
was 8,021,071. Some 7,135,421, or 89 per cent, lived in rural areas and 
893,650, or 11 per cent, lived in urban areas. The total estimated number of 
households was 1,872,174 made up of 1,659,400 rural households (7,135,421 
divided by the average rural household size of 4.3) and 212,774 urban 
households (893,650 divided by the average urban household size of 4.2). 
The names and codes of the areas that were randomly sampled, as well as 
the number of enumeration areas that were sampled in each, are shown in the 
schedule below. Since the average size of the population in urban enumeration 
areas was estimated at 1,353, and that in rural enumeration areas at 942, the 
urban weight was estimated as: 
Average urban population per enumeration area , . , , — x rural weight 
Average rural population per enumeration area 
1353 x rural weight = 1.44 x rural weight 
942 
With an adjustment for a rural sampling fraction of 5, the rural weight was 
estimated as: 
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n , . , . Total number of rural enumeration areas Rural weight = — 
Total number of sampled rural enumeration areas 
7 363 x an adjustment for a rural sampling fraction = ' x 5 
= 175 x 5 = 875 
And with an adjustment for an urban sampling fraction of 3, the urban 
weight was estimated as: 
XT , . , t , AA , Total number of urban enumeration areas Urban weight = 1.44 x 
Total number of sampled enumeration areas 
635 x an adjustment for an urban sampling fraction = 1.44 x x 3 
46 
= 2 0 x 3 = 6 0 
A. Rural Areas 
Number of sampled 
Area Code enumeration areas 
Dowa District 11 6 
Lilongwe District 12 6 
Mangochi District 24 6 
Mzimba District 6 6 
Nkhata Bay District 7 6 
Rumphi District 5 6 
Zomba District 21 6 
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B. Urban Areas 
Number of sampled 
Area Code enumeration areas 
Blantyre City 20 24 
Mangochi Township 23 6 
Mponela Township 10 4 
Mzimba Boma 3 2 
Mzuzu City 1 6 
Nkhata Bay Boma 4 2 
Rumphi 2 2 
To obtain the national estimate for a particular characteristic, the rural 
sample count was multiplied by 60 and the urban sample count by 875. Urban 
and rural estimates so found were added together. This approach was used to 
estimate the number of households that participated in various informal 
financial activities as lenders, borrowers or savers. 
Notes 
1. The present study is the second phase of the AERC sub-network on the 
informal financial sector and is devoted entirely to the issue of linkages 
between the informal and the formal/semi-formal financial sectors. The first 
phase of the research investigated the nature, size and role of the informal 
financial sector in Malawi. The results of that research were published as 
AERC Research Paper 4 (Chipeta and Mkandawire, 1990). 
2. The term informal financial sector refers to economic entities which are 
involved in mobilizing financial and non-financial resources and/or in 
lending those resources but which are neither legally licensed or registered, 
nor directly amenable to control by monetary and financial policy 
instruments. These entities consist of individuals, associations, non-financial 
business firms, government and non-governmental organizations. This 
classification scheme excludes from the definition of the informal financial 
sector, those financial institutions which are subject to registration or 
licensing in accordance with appropriate legislation and which are, in 
addition, amenable to control and regulation by monetary and financial 
policy instruments. These institutions, which constitute the formal financial 
sector, in Malawi consist of the central bank, two commercial banks, the 
building society, the Post Office Savings Bank (POSB), eight insurance and 
assurance companies, two hire purchase and lease finance companies and 
one development bank. It also excludes a number of semi-formal financial 
institutions that are subject to nominal regulation and control even though 
their businesses are formally registered under the provisions of appropriate 
statute law. In Malawi these institutions are the credit unions that operate 
under the direction and control of the Malawi Union of Savings and Credit 
Co-operatives (MUSCCO), two small development finance companies that 
serve the small-scale and medium-scale business community, a smallholder 
agricultural credit fund and a newly established village banking institution 
catering for the needs of low-income rural households who have no 
alternative sources of credit. 
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3. Direct deposit and credit links cannot be conceptualized as competitive or 
complementary. 
4. Some writers are not enthusiastic. To the extent that the IFS and the FFS 
serve the interests of different types of clientele, the integration of the two 
sectors may not benefit the weaker (infprmal) sector of the economy, a 
sector for which the FFS has not shown much concern (Bouman, 1977). 
5. Other lenders that failed to meet the whole demand for informal credit were 
traders, grain millers, smallholder farmers, and employers. The amounts 
involved here were not quantified. 
References 
Acharya, S. and S. Madhura (1983) "Informal credit markets and black 
money: Do they frustrate monetary policy?", Economic and Political 
Weekly,. 8, 1751-1756. 
— (1984) "Informal credit markets and monetary policy", Economic and 
Political Weekly, September, XIX, 36. 
Aryeetey, E. (1991) "The relationship between formal and informal sectors in 
the financial market in Ghana", a final research report presented at AERC 
Workshop, Nairobi 26-30 May. 
Bell, C. (1990) "Interaction between institutional and informal credit agencies 
in rural India", World Bank Economic Review, 4, 3, 295-327. 
Bell, C., T.N. Srinivasan, and C. Udry (1990) Agricultural Credit Markets in 
Punjab: Segmentation, Rationing and Spillover, New Haven, Connecticut: 
Yale University. 
Bouman, F.A. (1977) "Indigenous savings and credit societies in the 
developing world", Savings and Development, 4. 
Chandavarkar, A.G. (1990) "Macroeconomic aspects, foreign flows and 
domestic savings performance in developing countries: a 'state of the art' 
report", OECD, February. 
Chipeta, C. and M.L.C. Mkandawire (1990) "The informal financial sector and 
macroeconomic adjustment in Malawi", AERC Research Paper No. 4. 
Nairobi: Initiatives Publishers. 
Cole, D. and Y.C. Park (1983) Financial Development in Korea 1941-1978, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Germidis, D. (1990) "Interlinking the formal and informal financial sectors." 
Savings and Development, 14, 1, 5-22. 
Johnston, H. (1968) "Problems of efficiency in monetary management", 
Journal of Political Economy, 76, 971-90, October. 
Malawi Government/US AID (1987) New Directions for Promoting Small and 
Medium• Scale Enterprises in Malawi: Constraints and Prospects for 
Growth, Lilongwe: USAID. 
Quarcoo, P.K. (1979) "Credit allocation in segmented capital markets of 
under-developed economies", Savings and Development, 3, 3, 198-213. 
- (1980) "Strategies for unifying domestic capital markets of under-developed 
economies", Savings and Development, Vol. IV, No. 2, 139-155. 
LINKS BETWEEN FINANCIAL SECTORS IN MALAWI 3 9 
Russel, R.P. and M. Wilkinson (1979) Microeconomic: A Synthesis of Modern 
and Neoclassical Theory, New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
Wai, U. Tun (1981) "Role of unorganised financial markets still important in 
developing countries", paper given to the Thirteenth Seanza Central 
Banking Course, Jakarta, October 1980. 
— (1980) "Strategies for unifying domestic capital markets in LDCs" Savings 
and Development, 4, 2, 139-55. 
— (1984) "Informal credit markets and monetary policy", Economic and 
Political Weekly, 9, 36, September. 
AFRICAN ECONOMIC RESEARCH CONSORTIUM 
AERC 
CREA 
P. O. BOX 62882 
NAIROBI, KENYA 
TELEPHONE (254-2) 228057 225234 
215898 212359 332438 225087 
TELEX 22480 
FAX (254-2) 219308 
T h e principal objective of the African Economic Research 
Consortium (AERC), established in August 1988, is to 
strengthen local capacity for conducting independent, 
rigourous inquiry into problems pertinent to the manage-
ment of economies in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
In response to special needs of the region, AERC has 
adopted a flexible approach to improve the technical skills 
of local researchers, allow for regional determination of 
research priorities, strengthen national institutions con-
cerned with economic policy research, and facilitate closer 
ties between researchers and policymakers. 
Since its establishment, AERC has been supported by pri-
vate foundations, bilateral aid agencies and international 
organizations. 
SPECIAL PAPERS contain the findings of commissioned 
studies in furtherance of AERC's programmes for research, 
training and capacity building. 
RESEARCH PAPERS contain the edited and externally 
reviewed results of research financed by the AERC. 
It is AERC's policy that authors of Special and Research 
Papers are free to use material contained therein in other 
publications. Views expressed in the Special and Research 
Papers are those of the authors alone and should not be 
attributed to the AERC's sponsoring Members, Advisory 
Committee, or Secretariat. 
Further information concerning the AERC and addi-
tional copies of Special and Research Papers can be obtained 
by writing to: African Economic Research Consortium, P.O. 
Box62882, Nairobi, Kenya. 
